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Abstract
Gift-giving customs are ubiquitous in social, political, and business life. Legal
regulation and industry guidelines for gifts are often based on the assumption that
large gifts potentially influence behavior and create conflicts of interest, but small
gifts do not. However, scientific evidence on the impact of small gifts on business
relationships is scarce. We conducted a natural field experiment in collaboration
with sales agents of a multinational consumer products company to study the in-
fluence of small gifts on the outcome of business negotiations. We find that small
gifts matter. On average, sales representatives generate more than twice as much
revenue when they distribute a small gift at the onset of their negotiations. How-
ever, we also find that small gifts tend to be counterproductive when purchasing
and sales agents meet for the first time, suggesting that the nature of the business
relationship crucially affects the profitability of gifts.
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Trust not their presents
Virgil, The Aeneid
1 Introduction
Gifts are commonly used to cultivate social and economic relationships (Waldfogel 1993;
Cialdini 1985; Mauss 1967). For example, the pharmaceutical industry spends billions
of dollars every year on gifts for health care professionals (Gagnon and Lexchin 2008;
Weintraub 2007; Wazana 2000). These gifts range from travel funding and free lunch
to drug samples and penlights (Campbell et al. 2007). Similarly, public officials often
receive unsolicited gifts or free food and beverages from lobbyists and special interest
groups (Susman 2008). The ethical appropriateness of these practices and their potential
to create conflicts of interest is intensively debated, as the lines between gifts and bribes
are often not clear-cut (Fisher 2007; Katz et al. 2003; Fain 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1998;
McCracken and Callahan 1996). Commonly implemented regulatory practices are so-
called de minimis rules, which allow the acceptance of gifts up to a certain threshold
value. For example, more than half of the US states have implemented a de minimis rule
for legislators, with thresholds ranging from 10 US dollars per year in Arizona to 500 US
dollars in Texas (see NCSL 2014).1 The implicit assumption behind these policies and
guidelines is that while expensive gifts potentially influence behavior, small gifts do not.
However, scholars in anthropology and social psychology argue that gifts, irrespective
of their value, can impose strong feelings of indebtedness and create an obligation to
reciprocate with even larger favors (Cialdini 1985; Mauss 1967; Gouldner 1960). These
concerns have led critics to propagate zero gift policies rather than de minimis rules
(Katz et al. 2003; Fain 2002). Despite its policy relevance, the impact of small gifts on
business relationships remains largely unexplored.
1The industry guidelines of the American Medical Association restricts gifts from pharmaceuticals
to physicians worth more than 100 US dollar (see Grande 2010).
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This paper presents a natural field experiment that tests the impact of small gifts on
the outcome of business negotiations.2 The experiment was conducted in collaboration
with a group of sales representatives of a large multinational consumer products company
located in Switzerland. The sales agents visited 220 drug stores and pharmacies to sell
beauty and health care products and distributed a small gift to a random subset of
potential buyers at the beginning of their sales negotiations. The gift consisted of a
sample of six tubes of toothpaste costing less than 10 US dollars. This unique setup
allows us to provide causal field evidence for reciprocal responses to gift-giving in a
business-to-business context. Our null hypothesis is that sales revenues are equal in the
two treatments; our alternative hypothesis is that sales revenues are higher in the gift
treatment compared to the control treatment.
The results show that even a small gift can have a substantial influence on the success
of sales negotiations. The sales representatives generate, on average, more than twice
as much revenue when they hand over the toothpaste at the beginning of their sales
negotiation. In a post-hoc analysis we use additional information gathered in the field
experiment to provide explorative evidence on potential drivers of the observed treatment
effect. The treatment effect is particularly pronounced for sales negotiations with store
managers: In this case, gifts increase sales revenue by more than 300 percent. Overall,
the sales boost is large enough to render gift-giving a profitable strategy for the firm.
However, we also find that the impact of gift-giving crucially depends on the nature
of the relationship between business partners: When the sales agents negotiate with a
potential buyer they meet for the first time, the gift tends to hamper negotiations and
reduces revenue.
Our field experiment makes several contributions to the literature. First, a substan-
tial amount of evidence from laboratory experiments documents that reciprocal behavior
2According to Harrison and List’s (2004) taxonomy, natural field experiments are studies in which
behavior is observed in an environment where subjects naturally make the decisions of interest, and
where subjects are typically unaware of the exogenously imposed treatment conditions. List (2011)
discusses various methodological challenges of conducting field experiments.
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is widespread: People respond to kind or hostile actions likewise, even if reciprocating is
costly and yields no future benefits.3 More recently, an active debate emerged, question-
ing the extent to which laboratory results are generalizable to naturally occurring market
settings (see Al-Ubaydli and List 2015; DellaVigna 2009; Falk and Heckmann 2009; and
Levitt and List 2007). In our field experiment, the purchasing agents did not know they
were participating in an experiment. Therefore, social desirability effects, which could
overstate the importance of prosocial behavior in laboratory settings (Levitt and List
2007), should be absent in our environment. Moreover, the study was integrated into
the daily routine of the sales agents and therefore allowed them to behave naturally. In
contrast to the usual student subject pool in lab experiments, we analyze the behavior
of experienced market participants who are familiar with the commonly used persua-
sion tactics in the sales business.4 We thus contribute to the growing literature on gift
exchange in the field (e.g., Carpenter 2017; Esteves-Sorenson 2017; Bradler et al. 2016;
DellaVigna et al. 2016; Cohn et al. 2015, 2014; Kube et al. 2013, 2012; Bellemare and
Shearer 2009; Gneezy and List 2006). Most field experiments focus on monetary gift
exchange in the labor market and study whether workers reciprocate higher wages with
more effort.5 Falk (2007) analyzes gift-exchange in a non-market context and finds that
enclosing gifts in solicitation letters increases charitable giving. In an audit study con-
ducted in Chinese hospitals, Currie et al. (2013) demonstrate that gifts from patients to
physicians reduce the prescription of unnecessary antibiotics and increase service qual-
ity, even for third parties associated with the gift giver. List (2006) conducted a field
experiment at a sports cards fair and shows that customers who make higher prices
3See Fehr and Gächter (2000) for an overview. A related emerging literature studies bribing and
reciprocity in laboratory settings (e.g., Malmendier and Schmidt 2017; Gneezy et al. 2015; Abbink et al.
2002).
4See Williams et al. (2004) for evidence that knowledge of persuasive intentions can reduce the
susceptibility to persuasion.
5Kube et al. (2012) compare monetary and non-monetary gifts and find that non-monetary gifts
results in stronger reciprocal reactions than a corresponding cash gift, suggesting that the nature of the
gift matters. DellaVigna et al. (2016), however, do not find that workers reciprocate non-monetary gifts
with higher productivity. See also Fehr et al. (2009) for a survey on the role of fairness motives in the
labor market.
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offers receive cards of better quality in return. However, the results also indicate that
this relationship holds only when third parties can verify quality. Kirchler and Palan
(2018) study the effect of tipping and verbal compliments on service quality in fast food
restaurants.6 In contrast to the previous literature, we experimentally study the im-
pact of gift-giving in a real world business-to-business context. We see our setting as a
conservative test for the impact of gift-giving on reciprocal behavior, as the purchasing
agents and in particular the store managers should be familiar with the instruments of
persuasive marketing tactics.7
Second, our results relate to the theoretical literature studying the origins and motives
of gift-giving. The prevalence of in-kind gift-giving is puzzling from a standard economic
point of view, as cash transfers are in general more efficient than non-monetary gifts,
which might be of low or no value to the recipient (see Waldfogel 1993). Several theo-
ries propose that in-kind gifts can be used to signal one’s intention to invest in future
relationships (Sozou and Seymour 2005; Bolle 2001; Carmichael and MacLeod 1997;
Camerer 1988).8 According to these theories, gifts should be especially effective when
used to initiate new business relations. Our results, however, do not support this con-
jecture. While gifts foster sales in established business relations, they do not generate
more revenue in negotiations with prospective customers—if anything, they tend to be
counterproductive.
Third, our paper also relates to the common marketing practice of distributing free
6A related literature on survey design studies the effectiveness of noncontingent rewards on mail
and telephone survey participation (e.g., Singer et al. 2000). For example, Gneezy and Rey-Biel (2014)
find that even very small financial rewards (e.g., 1 US dollar) were able to increase survey response
rates, but only when the reward was paid upfront, independent of participation in the survey. However,
larger payments (i.e., larger than 15 US dollars) were more effective when they were made contingent
on participation.
7Wazana (2000) provides a survey of a related literature studying the reactions of physicians to gifts
received by the pharmaceutical industry. However, none of those studies exploit experimental or quasi-
experimental data. Moreover, in contrast to our setting, most of these studies cannot isolate reciprocal
behavior from product familiarization and information effects: Free drug samples or business lunches
could also affect future prescription behavior through standard informational channels.
8See Ellingsen and Johannesson (2011), Kaplan and Ruﬄe (2009), and Prendergast and Stole (2001)
for further theoretical accounts of non-monetary gift-giving.
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samples (see e.g. Cialdini 1985). However, there is astonishingly little evidence on the
impact of free product samples on sales (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004). Moreover, the
existing literature has mainly focused on product familiarization and learning effects
associated with trying product samples.9 In our experiment, purchasing decisions are
made on the spot, leaving the buyer no time to sample the gift. Thus, we depart from
the existing marketing literature, by investigating the social aspect of gift-giving rather
than its effects on product familiarization.
2 Experimental Setting and Design
Setting
We conducted our field experiment in collaboration with a Swiss subsidiary of a large
multinational consumer goods company. More specifically, the experiment involved a
group of five sales representatives (three males and two females) who were responsible
for beauty and health care products (e.g., shower gels, body lotions, deodorants, etc.).
All of them have long work experience in the sales business. They work in different
regions, covering the entire Swiss market. The representatives are paid a fixed wage,
without any explicit performance incentives.10 Their main task is to visit and cultivate
relationships with the firm’s customers, who are purchasing agents or managers of retail
shops, ranging from small independent stores to branches of large retail chains. The field
experiment involved a subset of those retail shops, namely drug stores and pharmacies.
We study only a subset of the firm’s customers for two reasons: (i) it ensured a sufficiently
large number of potential sales negotiations with a relatively homogenous set of stores
9Lammers (1991), Steinberg and Yalch (1978), and Scott (1976) provide field evidence concerning
the impact of free samples on purchasing behavior. In one of the rare field experiments focusing on
reciprocity in the business to consumer context, Strohmetz et al. (2002) find that distributing a small
piece of chocolate with the check significantly increased the tips given to the servers in a restaurant.
10In communication with the management we learned that the main reason for the absence of perfor-
mance incentives is to avoid that agents push sales in the short-run at the expense of long-term customer
satisfaction and hop from one job to the other in the pursuit of high commissions.
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and products, and (ii) the purchasing agents of these stores do not face any restrictions
with respect to the receipt of free product samples.
The firm categorizes customers into five different levels of sales potential, ranging from
A (highest sales potential) to E (lowest potential). This ranking is based on the firms’
prior assessment of the customer (firm size, location, past sales etc.). The rankings are
occasionally updated based on the sales agents’ feedback, and we observe three instances
in which the sales agents requested a change in the category after the negotiation. In
order to avoid endogeneity problems we use the original customer category prior to the
negotiation in our analysis. The purpose of the ranking is to provide guidance for the
sales agents on how much time and effort they should invest in the relationship with a
specific customer. We use this ranking in our regression analysis to control for differences
in previous buying propensities between stores.
In the design stage of the field experiment, we surveyed the sales representatives
about their sales strategies and routines. They regularly visit customers to present new
offers and special promotions. The frequency of visits depends on the customer ranking,
while the sequence of visits on a given day is determined by geographical proximity. The
sales representatives usually drop in without prior notice and try to address the manager
of the retail store. In case the manager is busy or absent, they speak to another staff
member. The purchasing agents and sales agents often know each other personally,
but sales agents occasionally visit prospective customers to enlarge their customer base.
Every sales representative is equipped with a folder containing product offers. The
majority of the offers are new products or special promotions of existing products. In
case a purchasing agent is interested in a product, the sales representatives take the
order immediately at the end of the negotiation using the order forms in their sales
folder. Sales negotiations typically last ten to fifteen minutes.
We were particularly interested in one aspect of sales strategies, namely their gift-
giving practices. All sales representatives had previously used product samples as gifts
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in their business negotiations. However, these gifts were used rather infrequently and
they were almost always handed over after a successful deal. A small independent survey
which we conducted with employees and managers (n = 32) from different drug stores
and pharmacies confirmed this. Except for two respondents, all have received gifts from
sales agents in the past, and 90 percent of the respondents indicate that they typically
received gifts after the sales meeting. In our setting, receiving a gift at the onset of a
meeting should therefore come as a surprise to the purchasing agents.
Experimental Design
Two weeks before the experiment, the sales agents attended a briefing led by one of
the authors. We explicitly told the sales agents that their data would not be used for
individual performance comparisons and that all data would be anonymized.
After a short introduction, they received detailed instructions about the procedures
of the experiment. Each sales agent received a folder containing numbered data sheets for
every upcoming sales negotiation. Each sheet contained a text box with the instructions
for the corresponding negotiation. In particular, the instructions indicated the treatment
condition for the next sales pitch: In the “Gift” treatment, sales agents had to hand over
six tubes of toothpaste as a “free sample product from the firm” right at the beginning
of their negotiations. The value of the gift was roughly 10 Swiss francs in total (or
7.7 US dollars at the time of the experiment). We chose a gift of similar value to
those the sales agents had previously used. In addition, we made sure that the gift is
equally attractive to men and women. In the control treatment, the sales agents did
not distribute any gift. The sequence of the treatments in each sales agent’s folder
was randomly determined in advance and they were instructed to work through the
folder sheet by sheet without skipping a sheet or changing the order.11 During the field
experiment, all sellers were equipped with the same sales folders containing five special
11We cross-checked the date and time of each visit with the randomly assigned ordering of sheets and
found that the sales agents followed our instructions.
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offers.12 Apart from the treatment manipulation, the sales agents were instructed to
follow their usual negotiation routines. We purposely did not restrict their behavior and
refrained from using a fixed protocol to keep the situation as natural as possible. The
within sales agent randomization allows us to control for differences in negotiation style
between the sales agents by controlling for agent fixed effects.13
In addition to the instructions, the data sheets also contained a short survey, which
provides the data for our analysis. The first part of the survey was filled out before
each sales negotiation and asked for (i) the customer category (A, B, C, D, or E), and
(ii) whether the customer was being visited for the first time. Immediately after the
sales meeting the sales agents filled out the second part of the survey, containing (iii) the
number of offers they were able to show to the purchasing agent (as a proxy for attention),
(iv) the sales revenue they generated for each of the five offers, (v) the duration of the
sales negotiation, and (vi) whether they negotiated with the store manager14 or another
staff member. For a translation of the data sheet see online appendix B. Because the
sales agents typically dropped in without prior notice they either negotiated with the
store manager, or, if unavailable, with whoever was responsible from the staff. The
sales agents took all orders at the end of the negotiation, by letting their negotiation
partner fill out and sign an order form. After the meeting the sales agents transferred the
completed order forms to the firm to deploy and ship the orders. For our experiment, the
sales agents additionally recorded the ordered units and the resulting revenue for each
of the five special offers in the data sheet. Our dependent variable is the total revenue
generated with the five offers.
12We used several sets of sales folders in order to test various modes of product presentation, which
were primarily in the interest of the firm. Treatment Gift and the different forms of product presentation
were orthogonal by design.
13Given that we had to inform the sales agents about the treatment one might worry that they
adjusted their sales effort in response to the gift. We elicited two proxies for sales agents’ effort: the
duration of the meeting with a customer, and the number of offers that were presented. We find no
indication that the sales agents altered their behavior in response to the treatment (see Table A1 in the
online appendix).
14Given that most of the firms in our sample are single proprietor firms, the store managers typically
also own the store.
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The last part of the briefing consisted of mock sales negotiations. In order to ac-
quaint the sales agents with the experimental procedures, each of them went through
a hypothetical sales negotiation and filled out the data sheet. Every sales agent was
identified through a code, which preserved anonymity. The data collection spanned over
two months. Customers were only visited once during the experiment. We were able to
collect data from a total of 220 sales negotiations; 109 in the Gift treatment and 111 in
the control treatment.15
3 Experimental Results
Randomization check and empirical strategy
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all background variables we elicited. Among the
220 negotiations recorded for this study, sales agents negotiate with a male purchasing
agent in 25 percent of the cases, and in 35 percent of the cases they are able to speak to
the manager. In 37 percent of the negotiations sales agents do not know the customer
from prior visits.
Table 1 also provides the p-values for differences between the gift and the control
treatment.16 The first two variables refer to the negotiation partner (gender and whether
he or she was a manager or member of the regular staff), followed by two variables
measuring whether the sales agent has visited the respective customer before, and the
number of visits during the previous year. None of these variables are significantly
different across treatments. Next we have five dummy variables for the customer category
and one variable indicating whether the store is located in a shopping mall. All but one
are insignificant. The exception is the dummy variable for “Customer category E”, which
15Due to the additional workload imposed on the sales representatives the firm offered us a limited
time window to run the experiment. The number of observations is determined by the number of
negotiations with pharmacies and drug stores the sales agents had during that time.
16We report two-sided p-values throughout the text.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and randomization check
Total sample Gift Control
N = 220 n = 109 n = 111
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd p−value
Male purchasing agent 0.255 0.437 0.284 0.453 0.225 0.420 0.314
Manager 0.350 0.478 0.358 0.482 0.342 0.477 0.810
First visit 0.373 0.485 0.367 0.484 0.378 0.487 0.861
# Visits 1.973 2.532 2.220 2.773 1.730 2.256 0.243
Customer category A 0.055 0.228 0.064 0.246 0.045 0.208 0.531
Customer category B 0.205 0.404 0.229 0.422 0.180 0.386 0.366
Customer category C 0.409 0.493 0.450 0.500 0.369 0.485 0.227
Customer category D 0.059 0.236 0.064 0.246 0.054 0.227 0.749
Customer category E 0.273 0.446 0.193 0.396 0.351 0.480 0.008
Store in shopping mall 0.286 0.453 0.294 0.458 0.279 0.451 0.815
German language region 0.927 0.260 0.927 0.262 0.928 0.260 0.970
Morning (8am-12pm) 0.550 0.499 0.550 0.500 0.550 0.500 0.989
Noon (12pm-2pm) 0.118 0.324 0.156 0.364 0.081 0.274 0.085
Afternoon (2pm-7pm) 0.332 0.472 0.294 0.458 0.369 0.485 0.233
Monday 0.241 0.429 0.239 0.428 0.243 0.431 0.935
Tuesday 0.227 0.420 0.220 0.416 0.234 0.425 0.804
Wednesday 0.114 0.318 0.101 0.303 0.126 0.333 0.556
Thursday 0.150 0.358 0.193 0.396 0.108 0.312 0.079
Friday 0.268 0.444 0.248 0.434 0.288 0.455 0.497
Calendar week 1 0.073 0.260 0.083 0.277 0.063 0.244 0.578
Calendar week 2 0.118 0.324 0.110 0.314 0.126 0.333 0.713
Calendar week 3 0.118 0.324 0.147 0.356 0.090 0.288 0.193
Calendar week 4 0.127 0.334 0.101 0.303 0.153 0.362 0.245
Calendar week 5 0.200 0.401 0.202 0.403 0.198 0.400 0.946
Calendar week 6 0.105 0.307 0.119 0.326 0.090 0.288 0.479
Calendar week 7 0.118 0.324 0.083 0.277 0.153 0.362 0.105
Calendar week 8 0.127 0.334 0.138 0.346 0.117 0.323 0.648
Calendar week 9 0.014 0.116 0.018 0.135 0.009 0.095 0.550
Sunny 0.323 0.469 0.294 0.458 0.351 0.480 0.359
Cloudy 0.564 0.497 0.606 0.491 0.523 0.502 0.215
Rain or snowfall 0.114 0.318 0.101 0.303 0.126 0.333 0.556
Sales rep 1 0.059 0.236 0.064 0.246 0.054 0.227 0.749
Sales rep 2 0.227 0.420 0.229 0.422 0.225 0.420 0.942
Sales rep 3 0.405 0.492 0.376 0.487 0.432 0.498 0.395
Sales rep 4 0.264 0.442 0.284 0.453 0.243 0.431 0.488
Sales rep 5 0.045 0.209 0.046 0.210 0.045 0.208 0.977
This table reports means and standard deviations in the total sample and in treatment Gift and Control. The last column
displays p-values for the null hypothesis of perfect randomization (χ2 tests in case of binary variables and Mann-Whitney
tests in case of interval variables). “Male purchasing agent” is a gender dummy. “Manager” is a dummy indicating that the
sales rep negotiated with the store manager. “First visit” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep visited the purchasing
agent for the first time. “# Visits” is the number of times the store has been visited in the previous year. “Customer
category” A to E are dummy variables indicating in which category a store falls. “Store in shopping mall” indicates
whether the store is located in a shopping mall. “German language region” is a dummy for negotiations in the German
Speaking part of Switzerland. “Morning”, “Noon”, and “Afternoon” are dummy variables indicating the time of the day,
“Monday” to “Friday” are week day dummies and “Calendar week” 1 to 9 are dummies indicating the week of the year.
“Sunny”, “Cloudy”, and “Rain or snowfall” are dummies for self-assessed weather conditions. “Sales agent” 1 to 5 are
dummies identifying the different sales agents.
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is more frequent in the control treatment than in the Gift treatment.17 We control for
customer category in all regressions. The remaining variables are dummies for time of
the day, day of the week, and calendar week, followed by dummies for the sales agents.
None of these variables are significantly different across treatment.
We estimate the following linear model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
(1) Yit = αi + βGiftit + γXit + δTit + it,
where Yit is either the total sales revenue or a dummy variable indicating strictly positive
sales revenue for sales agent i at time t. Giftit is a binary treatment variable. We include
individual fixed effects αi that capture differences in negotiation style between sales
agents. We also include customer category fixed effects (Xit) in order to control for
differences in sales potential between stores. In addition, we control for time of the day,
day of the week, and calendar week fixed effects, as well as sales agent specific linear
time trends (Tit). Because our key regressor, Giftit, is randomly assigned within sales
representatives there is no need to cluster standard errors (see Cameron and Miller 2015).
Moreover, the sales rep fixed effects αi absorb individual specific common shocks.
The influence of gift-giving on sales revenue
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows that the gift has a substantial positive influence on sales
revenue. On average, sales agents more than double their sales revenue when they hand
over the gift at the beginning of their negotiations. The regression results reported
in Table 3 underpin these findings statistically. Columns (1) and (2) illustrate that
treatment Gift significantly increases sales revenue irrespective of whether or not we
17We investigated whether the sales representative deviated from the predetermined order on the
data/treatment instruction sheets in their folder, potentially favoring higher category customers for the
gift treatment. We cross-checked the consecutively numbered data/treatment instruction sheets with
the date and time of each negotiation and found that all sales agents followed the instructions.
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Figure 1: Small Gifts Lubricate Sales Negotiations
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Notes. This figure shows the average sales revenue in treatment Gift and the control condition. Panel
(a) is based on the full sample of negotiations (N = 220). In panel (b), the sample is restricted to
negotiations with the store managers (n = 77), and panel (c) is based on the sub-sample of negotiations
with the regular staff (n = 143). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
control for customer categories, time of the day, day, week fixed effects and agent specific
time trends in addition to the sales agent fixed effects (p = 0.019, respectively p = 0.026).
We therefore reject our null hypothesis that gift-giving does not affect sales revenues.
Is the gift a profitable strategy from the perspective of the firm? On average, the gift
increases revenue by 58.4 Swiss francs. Whether this renders the gift profitable or not
depends on the firm’s profit margin. A profit margin as low as 18 percent would suffice to
make the gift of ten Swiss francs profitable on average. We do not have exact information
about the profit margin, but according to personal communication with employees of the
firm, we know that it clearly surpasses this threshold.
In a recent article Maniadis et al. (2014) demonstrate that, depending on the prior,
the number of researchers who investigate a specific empirical relationship, as well as
biases researchers might have when judging their own work, the risk of false positives
can be quite substantial. Given the statistical power of our design, we can calculate to
what extent our results should shift our priors about whether gift-giving affects sales
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Table 2: Prior and posterior probabilities
Post-study probabilities
pi k = 1 k = 2 k = 5 k = 10
0.20 0.76 0.69 0.52 0.38
0.50 0.93 0.90 0.81 0.71
0.80 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.91
Post-study probabilities (PSP) for a low,
medium and high prior (pi), and different
numbers of researchers k.
revenues. Using the method proposed by Maniadis et al. (2014), Table 2 shows the
post-study probabilities (PSP) for three priors (pi) and different numbers of researchers
working on the same question (k). The latter parameter decreases PSP as a larger
number of researchers independently studying the research question increases the chance
of any one study falsely finding a positive result. While we are not aware of other field
experimental studies in a business-to-business context, the table shows that for many
combinations of a medium or high prior probability (pi) the PSP are above 90 percent.
In the following we make use of additional information collected in the course of this
experiment to shed light on the possible drivers of the treatment effect. It is important to
note that we did not formulate hypotheses about these variables prior to the experiment.
Consequently, the explorative results that follow should be considered as suggestive and
need to be corroborated by future research.18
Our explorative analysis focuses on two subgroups. First, we distinguish between
negotiations with the store managers and other staff members. Managers have poten-
tially more authority to make acquisition decisions than the regular staff. Moreover,
regular staff members might not keep the gift for themselves and instead hand it over to
their manager. Indeed in our independent survey we find that virtually all respondents
in managerial positions use gifts and samples for private purposes, but only 38 percent
18List et al. (2016) propose a procedure to correct multiple hypothesis testing. Because we have a
large number of potential subgroups to consider (Manager, first visit, customer categories, shopping
mall, day of the week, etc.) we do not find significant results for any of the subgroups when correcting
for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 3: Sales revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Sales revenue in Swiss francs
Gift 78.939∗∗ 58.441∗∗ –1.545 55.422∗∗ –4.614
(33.337) (25.968) (23.794) (25.313) (24.063)
Gift × manager 175.825∗∗ 168.636∗∗
(78.761) (76.856)
Manager 39.491 55.974
(36.066) (37.797)
# Offers shown 12.622 21.828∗∗
(7.839) (8.957)
Constant 21.464 240.664 237.389∗ 184.060 134.966
(24.184) (153.437) (141.207) (165.763) (147.588)
Controls?
Agent FE yes yes yes yes yes
Agent time trend yes yes yes yes
Customer category FE yes yes yes yes
Time of day FE yes yes yes yes
Day of week FE yes yes yes yes
Week FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 220 220 220 220 220
R2 0.061 0.217 0.296 0.221 0.308
F 4.549 4.806 3.827 4.532 3.384
p 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). The dependent
variable is the total sales revenue generated during the negotiation. “Gift” is a dummy variable for
treatment Gift. “Manager” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep negotiated with the store manager.
The interaction term “Gift × manager” allows the treatment effect to differ between negotiations with
the store managers and regular staff. “# Offers shown” indicates how many of the five special offers
could be shown to the purchasing agent during the negotiations. All regressions include sales agent fixed
effects (FE). Regressions in column (2)–(5) include additional sales agent specific linear time trends and
fixed effects for customer categories B to E (as a proxy for sales potential), time of the day, day of the
week and calendar week. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
of the regular staff indicate that they keep gifts themselves. Second, we can distin-
guish between meetings where the sales agents knew the customer from previous visits
or not. This variation is interesting in the light of theories of gift-giving arguing that
gift-giving should be especially effective when it comes to establishing a new relationship
(Carmichael and MacLeod 1997; Camerer 1988).
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Managers and regular staff
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that the treatment effect is very large when the sales agents
negotiate with the store managers: sales revenue increase, on average, from 61 to 271
Swiss francs. In contrast, the gift has no impact when the recipients of the gift are
regular employees: average sales revenue is 45.3 in treatment Gift and 46.4 Swiss Francs
in the control condition (see panel c).
Column (3) of Table 3 illustrates that the effect is mainly driven by the negotiations
with the store managers. The coefficient estimate for treatment Gift is close to zero and
statistically insignificant (p = 0.948), suggesting that the gift does not influence sales
revenue when the sales agents negotiate with the regular staff. On the other hand, the
interaction effect “Gift × manager” is large and significant (p = 0.027). Sales revenue
increases by roughly 174 Swiss francs, on average, when the sales agents hand over the
gift at the beginning of the negotiations with the store managers (p = 0.014, Wald
test). One potential explanation for the different reactions of the managers and regular
staff is that managers have more leeway in their purchasing decisions than regular staff.
Alternatively, it is also possible that the regular staff members are less likely to keep the
gift for themselves and instead hand it over to their managers.19
The gift could have boosted sales indirectly by attracting the purchasing agents’
attention. We measure attention by counting how many of the five special offers from
the sales booklet the sales agents were able to present to the purchasing agents in a given
negotiation. The average number of offers shown is 3.79 in the control treatment and
4.16 in treatment Gift. To investigate the extent to which attention explains the effect
of the gift on sales revenue, we include the number of offers shown in column (4) and (5)
of Table 3. The coefficient of “# Offers shown” in column (4) is statistically insignificant
19We find the same qualitative pattern when we estimate the effects for each sales agent separately.
Table A3 in the online appendix shows that the point estimate for the gift is positive and the interaction
“Gift × manager” is positive and large for four out of five sales agents. The one agent for whom we do
not find a positive effect was newly hired, i.e., visited all customers for the first time. This is consistent
with the results on the role of relationships we report below.
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(p = 0.109), but becomes significant in column (5), where we include the interaction term
between treatment Gift and meetings with store managers (p = 0.016). Nevertheless, the
coefficient estimates of “Gift” in column (4) and “Gift × manager” in column (5) remain
almost unchanged in magnitude and statistical significance. These results suggest that
the gift influenced sales performance independent of attention effects.20
We further investigate whether the observed increase in sales revenue is due to a
higher sales likelihood or whether customers who receive a gift also placed larger orders,
i.e., we compare the influence of the gift at the extensive and intensive margin. For
this purpose, we estimate a linear probability model according to equation (1) using a
dummy variable which indicates strictly positive sales revenue (i.e., sales revenue > 0)
as dependent variable. Column (1) in Table 4 suggests that overall the gift did not
significantly influence the probability of making a deal (p = 0.703). However, column (2)
illustrates that the gift has a significantly stronger impact on the negotiations with
the store managers (p = 0.039). On average, the gift increases sales probability in
negotiations with store managers by 19.7 percentage points (p = 0.058, Wald test).
In column (3), we measure the impact of the gift on the intensive margin. For this
purpose, we restrict the sample to observations with a strictly positive sales revenue.
The results show that the treatment Gift has a sizable impact on the intensive margin.
Conditional on a deal, the gift increases revenue by approximately 280 Swiss francs
(p = 0.006). Finally, in column (4) we include the interaction effect “Gift × manager” to
test whether managers react differently to the gift conditional on a deal. We do not find
a significant interaction effect. This is consistent with our interpretation that some of the
regular staff members were not permitted to make purchasing decisions. In the restricted
sample with strictly positive sales revenue we measure the effect for staff members that
had more leeway in their purchasing decisions.
20One of the five special offers consisted of a combination of dental products (one toothpaste and
one toothbrush bundled together). We therefore analyzed whether the increase in revenue mostly stems
from this complementary special offer. Table A2 in the online appendix shows that, in contrary, our
main results are more pronounced for other products than dental products.
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Table 4: Extensive and intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Deal (dummy) Sales revenue
Gift 0.023 –0.066 278.728∗∗∗ 230.133∗
(0.060) (0.073) (97.106) (115.222)
Gift × manager 0.263∗∗ –35.285
(0.126) (253.546)
Manager 0.013 185.186
(0.090) (133.613)
Constant 0.561∗∗ 0.568∗∗ 938.486∗∗∗ 846.934∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.223) (293.266) (293.160)
Controls?
Agent FE yes yes yes yes
Agent time trend yes yes yes yes
Customer category FE yes yes yes yes
Time of day FE yes yes yes yes
Day of week FE yes yes yes yes
Week FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 220 220 73 73
R2 0.317 0.350 0.539 0.571
F 10.048 11.126 3.190 2.215
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). The dependent
variable in columns (1) and (2) is a dummy variable indicating a deal (i.e., sales revenue > 0). In
columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the total sales revenue generated during the negotiation.
“Gift” is a dummy variable for treatment Gift. “Manager” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep
negotiated with the store manager. The interaction term “Gift × manager” allows the treatment effect
to differ between negotiations with the store managers and regular staff. All regressions include sales
agent specific linear time trends and fixed effects for customer categories B to E (as a proxy for sales
potential), time of the day, day of the week and calendar week. In column (3), the sample is restricted
to observations with a positive revenue. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The role of relationships
The sales agents often know their customers personally from previous visits. However,
they occasionally negotiate with purchasing agents they have never met before. This
allows us to investigate whether the effect of the gift depends on the nature of the
relationship between the sales agents and purchasing agents.
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Table 5: Regression Results: First visits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Sales revenue in Swiss francs
Gift 130.912∗∗∗ 120.576∗∗∗ 49.102 23.063
(49.049) (42.677) (34.374) (35.682)
Gift × first visit –146.373∗∗∗ –150.893∗∗∗ –107.977∗∗ –51.629
(49.850) (54.999) (46.350) (42.877)
First visit –24.784 –0.077 –1.970 0.164
(30.686) (43.200) (42.632) (42.085)
Gift × manager 157.850∗∗ 222.695∗∗
(76.310) (99.505)
Manager 39.691 35.615
(35.677) (35.060)
Gift × manager × first –218.600∗∗
(99.761)
Constant 27.040 159.327 177.801 173.371
(26.578) (143.157) (135.239) (134.336)
Controls?
Agent FE yes yes yes yes
Agent time trend yes yes yes
Customer category FE yes yes yes
Time of day FE yes yes yes
Day of week FE yes yes yes
Week FE yes yes yes
Observations 220 220 220 220
R2 0.112 0.246 0.310 0.325
F 5.961 3.570 3.168 4.006
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates (robust standard errors in parentheses). The dependent
variable is the total sales revenue generated during the negotiation. “Gift” is a dummy variable for
treatment Gift. “First visit” is a dummy indicating that the sales rep visited the purchasing agent for
the first time. “Gift × first visit”, “Gift ×manager”, and “Gift ×manager × first” are the corresponding
interaction terms. All regressions include sales agent fixed effects (FE). The regression in column (2)
includes additional sales agent specific linear time trends and fixed effects for customer categories B to
E (as a proxy for sales potential), time of the day, day of the week and calendar week. Significance
levels are denoted as follows: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Interestingly, the gift tends to be counterproductive when customers and sellers meet
for the first time (N = 82): while the average sales revenue in the control treatment
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is 23.5 Swiss francs, it is only half the size in treatment Gift (11.1 Swiss francs). The
regression results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 provide statistical support for this
finding: the coefficient of the “Gift × first visit” interaction term is significantly neg-
ative, irrespective whether we additionally control for customer categories, time of the
day, day and week fixed effects, and agent-specific time trends (p < 0.009).21 Adding up
the coefficient estimates for “Gift” and “Gift × first visit” yields a negative net treat-
ment effect for negotiations with prospective customers, but the effect does not reach
statistical significance (p = 0.311 and p = 0.275, respectively, Wald tests). In column (3)
we additionally include a dummy for negotiations with store manager and the “Gift ×
manager” interaction term, because first time encounters are less frequent for store man-
agers.22 The results show that the two interaction terms remain statistically significant
(p = 0.021 for “Gift × first visit” and p = 0.040 for “Gift × manager”). Finally, in
column (4) we included the three way interaction “Gift × manager × first visit”. The
three way interaction term is significantly negative (p = 0.030) and offsets the signifi-
cantly positive “Gift × manager” interaction effect (p = 0.026). Overall, these results
suggest that the influence of gifts is restricted to negotiations where there is some degree
of familiarity between the involved parties.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We conducted a natural field experiment to test whether small gifts lubricate business
negotiations. Sales representatives of a multinational consumer products company ran-
domly distributed a small gift to their trading partners at the onset of their negotiations.
The small gift substantially increases sales revenue, especially when the gift is handed
21As discussed in Footnote 19 we had one sales agent who was newly hired during the period of the
experiment and therefore did not know any of the buyers personally. Our results in Table 5 are robust
if we exclude observations from this newly hired employee. See Table A4 in the online appendix for the
results.
22While 42% of negotiations with the regular staff are first time encounters, among the store managers
only 29% are new encounters (p = 0.050, χ2 test).
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over to the store manager. Our study focuses on the immediate effects of a one-time
gift. An interesting next step would be to look at the long term effects and repeated
gift-giving. For example, it is conceivable that the gift has positive carryover effects on
future sales. Once a new product has made it into the product shelf, the store manager
is likely to keep it there and place follow up orders. On the other hand, the gift might
also have negative carryover effects: If repeated gift-giving creates a norm and gifts are
expected, or if the purchasing agents in the Gift treatment decrease their expenditures
in subsequent sales negotiations without gifts, the long term effect of the gift might be
smaller. Although our data does not allow to test for carryover effects, previous gift-
exchange studies suggest that intertemporal substitution is of second order importance
(see Kirchler and Palan 2018; Bellemare and Shearer 2009).
Our results also suggest that the influence of gifts on sales negotiations crucially de-
pends on the relationship between business partners. When the sales agents and the cus-
tomer meet for the first time and therefore do not know each other, gifts do not increase
sales on average. On the contrary, they even tend to hinder sales agents’ performance.
One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that the nature of the relationship de-
termines how recipients perceive gifts and the underlying intentions. When sales agents
and purchasing agents know each other, a gift can be seen as a gesture of friendship
or a thank you for the good relationship in the past. On the other hand, prospective
customers may become suspicious and consider the gift as a persuasive attempt to push
sales or even as a bribe. Trawick et al. (1989) conducted a survey among purchasing
agents and found that gifts are considered to be less ethical and to negatively affect
supplier choice if they are distributed to prospective instead of existing customers. An-
other possible explanation for the absence of reciprocal behavior relates to the concept
of social distance (e.g. Hoffman et al. 1996; Charness et al. 2007). Buyers might perceive
the social distance to be greater when dealing with an unknown customer and therefore
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feel less indebted to reciprocate.23
Our results are consistent with lab experimental evidence of gift-exchange and reci-
procity in one-shot situations. However, it is also conceivable that the purchasing agents
interpret the situation as a repeated game, and therefore respond to the gift strategically,
i.e., they spend more in order to receive additional gifts in the future. In fact, our results
that the regular staff and prospective customers—who might be less likely to perceive
the situation as a repeated game—do not respond to the gift, appear to be consistent
with a strategic form of reciprocity. On the other hand, given the marginal value of
the gift in relation to the costs of shelf and storage space, we think it is unlikely that
strategic considerations alone would produce such a strong increase in sales revenue.24
To conclude, our findings underscore that even small gifts can distort the outcome
of sales negotiations. The effect of the gift is surprisingly sizeable given that our set-
ting involves experienced market professionals who themselves use persuasive marketing
techniques in their daily business. Furthermore, the managers in our experiment are typ-
ically the owner of the business and bear the full consequences of their buying decisions.
The effect of the gift could be even larger in more typical bribing situations where people
in power receive gifts but the consequences of their actions are borne by third parties.
Recent laboratory evidence from Malmendier and Schmidt (2017) indeed suggests that
gifts have a stronger effect on behavior if third parties rather than the recipient bear
the costs. Therefore, the definition of gifts as bribes and their potential role in shaping
conflicts of interest should not be based on the value of gifts alone.
Finally, from a managerial perspective our results highlight the use of controlled field
23Interestingly, Bellemare and Shearer (2009) find that reciprocal behavior is more pronounced in their
labor market field experiment, as the workers’ tenure increases. It therefore seems that the interaction
between the giver-responder relationship and reciprocal motivation is not restricted to the specific setting
of this study.
24In addition, if purchasing agents respond to the standard practice of gift-giving (handing over gifts
after a good deal), we should expect a treatment effect opposite to what we observe. In the control
treatment, they might be tempted to inflate their orders in expectation of a gift, while there is no
immediate reason to do so in the Gift treatment (assuming that they do not expect to get a second
gift).
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experiments as a tool for evidence-based management (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006; Ander-
son and Simester, 2011), allowing practitioners to systematically compare the success of
different sales and negotiation techniques.
References
Abbink, Klaus, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner (2002): An experimental bribery
game, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 428–454.
Al-Ubaydli, Omar and John A List (2015): On the Generalizability of Experimental
Results in Economics, in: Guillaume Frechette and Andrew Scotter (Eds.), Handbook
of Experimental Economic Methodology, Oxford University Press.
Anderson, Eric T and Duncan Simester (2011): A Step-by-Step Guide to Smart Business,
Harvard Business Review, pp. 98–105.
Bawa, Kapil and Robert Shoemaker (2004): The Effects of Free Sample Promotions on
Incremental Brand Sales, Marketing Science, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 345–363.
Bellemare, C. and B. Shearer (2009): Gift Giving and Worker Productivity: Evidence
From a Firm-Level Experiment, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 67, pp. 233–244.
Bolle, Friedel (2001): Why to Buy Your Darling Flowers: On Cooperation and Exploita-
tion, Theory and Decision, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 1–28.
Bradler, Christiane, Robert Dur, Susanne Neckermann, and Arjan Non (2016): Employee
Recognition and Performance: A Field Experiment, Management Science, Vol. 62,
No. 11, pp. 3085–3099.
Camerer, Colin (1988): Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols, American Journal
of Sociology, Vol. 94 (Supplement), pp. S180–S214.
Cameron, A. Colin and Douglas L. Miller (2015): A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-
robust Inference, Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 317–372.
Campbell, Eric G., Russell L. Gruen, James Mountford, Lawrence G. Miller, Paul D.
Cleary, and David Blumenthal (2007): A national survey of physician–industry rela-
tionships, New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 356, No. 17, pp. 1742–1750.
Carmichael, H. Lorne and W. Bentley MacLeod (1997): Gift giving and the evolution of
cooperation, International Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 485–509.
Carpenter, Jeffrey (2017): The sequencing of gift exchange: A field trial, Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 139, pp. 26–31.
Charness, Gary, Haruvy Ernan, and Doron Sonsino (2007): Social Distance and Reci-
procity: An Internet Experiment, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 88–103.
23
Cialdini, Robert B. (1985): Influence: Science and Practice, Boston: Scott, Foresman
and Company.
Cohn, Alain, Ernst Fehr, and Lorenz Goette (2015): Fair Wages and Effort Provision:
Combining Evidence from a Choice Experiment and a Field Experiment, Management
Science, Vol. 61, No. 8, pp. 1777–1794.
Cohn, Alain, Ernst Fehr, Benedikt Herrmann, and Frédéric Schneider (2014): Social
Comparison and Effort Provision: Evidence from a Field Experiment, Journal of the
European Economic Association, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 877–898.
Currie, Janet, Wanchuan Lin, and Juanjuan Meng (2013): Social networks and ex-
ternalities from gift exchange: Evidence from a field experiment, Journal of Public
Economics, Vol. 107, pp. 19–30.
DellaVigna, Stefano (2009): Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 315–372.
DellaVigna, Stefano, John A List, Ulrike Malmendier, and Gautam Rao (2016): Esti-
mating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work, Working paper.
Ellingsen, Tore and Magnus Johannesson (2011): Conspicuous Generosity, Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 95, No. 9, pp. 1131–1143.
Esteves-Sorenson, Constança (2017): Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Addressing the
Conflicting Evidence with a Careful Test, Management Science.
Fain, Herbert (2002): The case for a zero gift policy, Public Integrity, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.
61–74.
Falk, Armin (2007): Gift-Exchange in the Field, Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 5, pp. 1501–
1511.
Falk, Armin and Jim J. Heckmann (2009): Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of
Knowledge in the Social Sciences, Science, Vol. 326, pp. 535–538.
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter (2000): Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 159–181.
Fehr, Ernst, Lorenz Goette, and Christian Zehnder (2009): A Behavioral Account of the
Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns, Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 1,
No. 1, pp. 355–384, doi: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143217.
Fisher, Josie (2007): Business marketing and the ethics of gift giving, Industrial Mar-
keting Management, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 99–108.
Gagnon, Marc-André and Joel Lexchin (2008): The cost of pushing pills: a new estimate
of pharmaceutical promotion expenditures in the United States, PLoS Medicine, Vol. 5,
No. 1, pp. e1–e1.
24
Gneezy, Uri and John A. List (2006): Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing
for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments, Econometrica, Vol. 74,
No. 5, pp. 1365–1384.
Gneezy, Uri and Pedro Rey-Biel (2014): On the relative efficiency of performance pay
and noncontingent incentives, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 12,
No. 1, pp. 62–72, doi: 10.1111/jeea.12062.
Gneezy, Uri, Silvia Saccardo, and Roel van Veldhuizen (2015): Bribery: Behavioral
Drivers of Distorted Decisions, Working paper.
Gouldner, A.W. (1960): The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, American
Sociological Review, Vol. 25, pp. 161–178.
Grande, David (2010): Limiting the influence of pharmaceutical industry gifts on
physicians: self-regulation or government intervention?, Journal of General Internal
Medicine, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 79–83.
Harrison, Glenn W and John A List (2004): Field Experiments, Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 1009–1055, doi: 10.1257/0022051043004577.
Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith (1996): Social Distance and
Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, American Economic Review, Vol. 86,
No. 3, pp. 653–660.
Kaplan, Todd R. and Bradley J. Ruﬄe (2009): In Search of Welfare-Improving Gifts,
European Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 445–460.
Katz, Dana, Arthur L. Caplan, and Jon F. Merz (2003): All Gifts Large and Small: To-
ward an Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving’, Amer-
ican Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 3, pp. 39–46.
Kirchler, Michael and Stefan Palan (2018): Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic
transactions: Evidence from the field, Experimental Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp.
205–230, doi: 10.1007/s10683-017-9536-1.
Kube, Sebastian, Michel A. Maréchal, and Clemens Puppe (2012): The Currency of
Reciprocity: Gift-Exchange in the Workplace, American Economic Review, Vol. 102,
No. 4, pp. 1644–1662.
Kube, Sebastian, Michel A. Maréchal, and Clemens Puppe (2013): Do Wage Cuts Dam-
age Work Morale? Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment, Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 853–870.
Lammers, Bruce H. (1991): The Effect of Free Samples on the Immediate Consumer
Purchase, Journal of Consumer Marketing, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 31–37.
Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List (2007): What do Laboratory Experiments Measuring
Social Preferences tell us about the Real World, Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 153–174.
25
List, John A. (2006): The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences
and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114,
No. 1, pp. 1–37.
List, John A (2011): Why Economists Should Conduct Field Experiments and 14 Tips
for Pulling One Off, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 3–16, doi:
10.1257/jep.25.3.3.
List, John A, Azeem M Shaikh, and Yang Xu (2016): Multiple Hypothesis Testing in
Experimental Economics, NBER Working Paper No. 21875.
Malmendier, Ulrike and Klaus Schmidt (2017): You Owe Me, American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 107, No. 2, pp. 493–526, doi: 10.1257/aer.20140890.
Maniadis, Zacharias, Fabio Tufano, and John A List (2014): One Swallow Doesn’t Make
a Summer: New Evidence on Anchoring Effects, American Economic Review, Vol.
104, No. 1, pp. 277–290, doi: 10.1257/aer.104.1.277.
Maréchal, Michel André and Christian Thöni (2007): Do Managers Reciprocate? Field
Experimental Evidence From a Competitive Market. University of St.Gallen Discus-
sion paper no. 2007-09.
Mauss, Marcel (1967): The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies,
New York: W. W. Norton.
McCracken, Gail K. and Thomas J. Callahan (1996): Is there such a thing as a free
lunch?, International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, Vol. 32,
No. 4, pp. 44–50.
NCSL, National Conference of State Legislators (2014): Legislator Gift Restrictions
Overview, http://tinyurl.com/mhvqvcr.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Robert I Sutton (2006): Evidence-based management, Harvard Busi-
ness Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, pp. 62–74.
Prendergast, Canice and Lars Stole (2001): The Non-Monetary Nature of Gifts, European
Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 10, pp. 1793–1810.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1998): Bribes and Gifts, in: Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Put-
terman (Eds.), Economics, Values and Organization, pp. 296–328, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Scott, Carol A. (1976): The Effects of Trial Incentives on Repeat Purchase Behavior,
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 13, pp. 263–269.
Singer, Eleanor, John Van Hoewyk, and Mary P Maher (2000): Experiments with In-
centives in Telephone Surveys, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 171–188,
doi: 10.1086/317761.
26
Sozou, Peter D. and Robert M. Seymour (2005): Costly but worthless gifts facilitate
courtship, Proceedings of the Royal Society: B Biological Sciences, Vol. 272, No. 1575,
pp. 1877–1884.
Steinberg, Sandon A. and Richard F. Yalch (1978): When Eating Begets Buying: The
Effects of Food Samples on Obese and Nonobese Shoppers, Journal of Consumer
Research, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 243–246.
Strohmetz, David B., Bruce Rind, Reed Fisher, and Michael Lynn (2002): Sweetening
the Till: The Use of Candy to Increase Restaurant Tipping, Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 300–3009.
Susman, Thomas M (2008): Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lob-
bying, Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity, and the Public Good, Stanford Law &
Policy Review, Vol. 19, pp. 10–22.
Trawick, I Fredrick, John E Swan, and David Rink (1989): Industrial buyer evaluation
of the ethics of salesperson gift giving; value of the gift and customer vs. prospect
status, Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 31–38.
Waldfogel, Joel (1993): The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, American Economic Review,
Vol. 83, pp. 1328–1336.
Wazana, Ashley (2000): Physicians and the pharmaceutical industry: is a gift ever just
a gift?, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 283, No. 3, pp. 373–380.
Weintraub, Arlene (2007): Will Pharma Finally Have To Fess Up?, Bloomberg Business,
http://tinyurl.com/zxtgq3y.
Williams, Patti, Gavan J. Fitzsimons, and Lauren G. Block (2004): When Consumers
Do Not Recognize “Benign” Intention Questions as Persuasion Attempts, Journal of
Consumer Research, Vol. 31, pp. 540–551.
27
